Many studies have explored the disclosures in annual reports of companies. Annual reports of banks differ significantly from annual reports of other business entities, particularly in terms of disclosed items. The aim of this article is to investigate the level of disclosures and which factors influence the level of disclosure in the annual reports of banks in Slovenia. Design/Methodology/Approach: We have observed disclosures of all banks in Slovenia for year 2012 and 2015. The factors as used in the study are age, size, the government share, profitability and complexity of a bank. Our disclosure checklist consists of 144 voluntary and mandatory items. Statistical analysis is performed using linear regression analysis. Results: The average score for banks in Slovenia is near 94 points or 63% of all possible disclosures. The results of analyses indicated positive associations and statistical correlations between the level of disclosure in annual reports and the size of a bank, the share of government ownership and negative statistical influence of the age of bank on the level of disclosure. Our results do not show statistically significant correlation between the level of disclosure and a bank's profitability and complexity, which is against theory and findings from other similar research. Conclusion: In our opinion, results well reflect the Slovenian banking system and how banks reveal their information. Our finding is that banks in Slovenia provide less information to the public compared to the average companies in other branches or banks in similarly developed countries. The paper's main contribution is to deepen our knowledge about disclosures in the bank's annual reports and the answers what are the influential factors of disclosures for banks.
Introduction
Banks in Slovenia have become the subject of intense public scrutiny. In December 2013, Slovenia recapitalized its ailing state-owned banks with 3.2 billion Euros (Bank of Slovenia, 2014) in order to escape the looming EU bailout. Today, details about their past activities are leaking into the public sphere, and banks are faced with a number of accusations and speculations regarding their use of non-transparent practices. Transparency has never been so important. Increased transparency of fair value reduces crash risk among U.S. banking firms (Wen-hsin Hsu, Pourjalali and Songa, 2018) . The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998) issues Guidance on Bank Transparency, with strongly recommends that banks address important disclosures in their financial reports and other disclosures to the public. With that banks will follow up a key to transparency as a key element of an effectively supervised, safe and sound banking system. Such information facilitates market participants' for assessment of banks and more efficient allocation of capital between banks since it helps the market to accurately assess and compare the risk and return prospects of individual banks (Hossain, 2008) . Disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market (Pivac, Vuko and Cular, 2017) .
The problem we address is how banks in Slovenia reach recommendations of disclosures. The aim of the paper is to explore how banks in Slovenia disclose informa-tion, and compare the level of disclosure with companies in other branches and banks in countries, by examining the factors that affect the level of disclosure in their annual reports. This paper examines the relation between company characteristics and the extent of disclosure, so the hypotheses are that size, age, and profitability of a company, its board structure, the share of government, ownership and the number of subsidiaries impact on the level of disclosures in annual reports of the Slovenians banks.
Our methodology for the assessment of disclosure scores is based on Hossain's formula (Hossain, 2008) . In this research, we analysed nearly one and a half million words from published annual reports to examine possible 144 items of disclosures of all Slovenians banks for years 2012 and 2015. The limitation of this study is that it only discusses data for two non-consecutive years which is due to the enormous amount of words (text) to examine..
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the regulatory environment for disclosure in Slovenia. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background for development a hypothesis and aims the importance of disclosure. The research design is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and analysis. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions, limitations and directions for future research.
The regulatory environment for disclosures of banks in Slovenia
Banks are required to prepare annual and consolidated annual reports for the previous fiscal year in compliance with relevant legal and professional provisions. The framework for financial reporting in Slovenia is provided by the Companies Act, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and other applicable regulations (Bank of Slovenia, 2013a, Article 2). A bank's business and financial reports are essentially similar to reports prepared by other companies; however, they are adapted to the specificities of the banking business and, therefore, differ from financial statements prepared by other companies. An important distinction is the disclosure of mandatory items, which banks are legally required to provide in their annual reports. Disclosure in annual reports of banks in Slovenia is governed by the following legal acts, implementing provisions, and professional standards:
• • which banks and savings banks are subject to disclosure provisions; • the scope, manner and frequency of disclosure;
• type of disclosure.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Disclosures are an important source of information for shareholders and the interested public (Shehata, 2014) . Shehata (2014) defines disclosure as a way of informing the public by means of annual reports. Banks are companies with special business model, so what is valid about disclosure in companies it can be applied to banks. Owusu-Ansah (1998) considers disclosure to be a means of communication of financial and non-financial information about a company's financial position and performance. Disclosures are divided into two major categories: mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory items are those which, based on the current legislation, must be disclosed by a company in its annual report. Voluntary disclosure, i.e. items disclosed by a company on a voluntary basis, is the providing of additional information when mandatory disclosure does not provide an accurate picture of a company. Meek et al. (1995 , in Shehata, 2014 define voluntary disclosure as additional financial and other relevant information e. g. corporate social responsibility Obafemi et al. (2018) , complementing the management's disclosures in order to assist readers of annual reports and enable them to make the best possible decisions.
What are the influencing factors of the level of disclosure in banks? Francis, Huang, Khurana, and Pereira (2009) find that industry growth rates across 37 observed countries pairs are higher when there is a greater level of corporate transparency. Baumann and Nier (2004) also observe an association between share price and the level of disclosure in banks: share prices are less volatile in banks disclosing more information and more volatile in banks disclosing less information. Lower share price volatility, in turn, means lower capital cost. Thus, more disclosure benefits both investors and banks. Neifara and Jarbouib (2018) research reveal the significant impact of independent directors on the voluntary disclosure of Islamic bank. It is also of advantage to the supervisors: the more items get disclosed, and hence the lesser the stock price volatil-ity, the lower the likelihood that the stock price will give wrong signals about a company's performance and risk. Tadesse (2006) argues for a positive association between the level of disclosure and transparency, which contributes to greater stability of the entire banking system. He notes that a banking crisis is less likely to occur in countries that have introduced stricter disclosure regulations in annual reporting because in such an environment it is less likely that banks will take excessive risk.
Do Slovenian banks meet the average score of disclosures? The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) has calculated the index of transparency. The CIFAR index is based on the average number of 90 different items disclosed by a sample of firms in each country. This measure widely used to measure cross-country differences in accounting standards and disclosure intensity. (CIFAR, 1993) . La Porta et al. (1998) found out, having investigated a large data set, that companies make up 70% of all possible points of disclosures. Similar Brown and Martinsson (2014) got a result of disclosure intensity by mean 71.95% of 20 annual reports in 20 countries across a World. So, if banks in Slovenia cover a 70% of total list of disclosures (see Appendix A) the Slovenian banks are on average score of disclosures and we can say that banks in Slovenia care about transparency.
Authors (e.g. Soliman, 2013 , Owusu-Ansah, 1998 , Shehata, 2014 , Hossain, 2008 , Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006 , Wen-hsin Hsu, Pourjalali and Songa, 2018 have examined factors influencing the level of disclosure in annual reports and the manner in which they impact different stakeholders. Among the most commonly stated factors are the following: size, age, and profitability of a company, its board structure, the share of government, ownership and the number of subsidiaries, i.e. its complexity.
Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that older companies disclose more relevant items, and relates this fact to lower cost of acquisition, processing, and communication of information to the public. He adds that younger companies that have yet to strengthen their competitive position on the market may suffer greater harm by disclosing certain information, as these might be used to the advantage of their competitors. Another argument he puts forward to support his claim is that older companies maintain fairly well-organized databases and have thus lower cost--both in terms of invested money and effort˗-when obtaining relevant information for disclosure. Akhtaruddin (2005 in Feytimi, 2014 notes that older companies disclose more relevant information because they wish to strengthen their position on the market and improve their reputation.
Hossaini (2008) finally concludes that the age of a bank does not have a statistically significant impact on the scope of disclosures in annual reports of banks in India. Based on this conflicting evidence, we set out to investigate our first hypothesis: H1: The level of disclosure is positively associated with the age of the bank. Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) were investigating the overall extent of disclosure by 70 banks located in 18 countries, they found out that the extent of disclosure was different among the countries examined, and that there was a positive relationship between the size of the bank and the level of disclosure indicated. Xudong et al. (2018) find out that larger banks better collect and share information. The size of a company, as measured by its average volume of assets, is a frequently used variable when assessing the level of disclosure in its annual reports (Zdolšek and Kolar, 2013) . Hossain (2008) highlights three aspects that influence this association in banks annual report: first, the cost of information gathering, which is lower in larger companies than in smaller; second, the intrinsic need of larger companies to disclose more information because they are more frequently listed on regulated or alternative markets; third, he argues that smaller companies feel more vulnerable and exposed if they disclose more information. Based on this, we stated the second hypothesis as follows: H2: The level of disclosure is positively associated with the size of a bank.
Most researchers also report a positive association between profitability and the level of disclosure in annual reports of banks, e. g. Baumann and Nier (2004) , Hossain and Hammami, 2009, Hossain (2008) . Inchausti (1997 in Hossain and Hammami, 2009 ) offers a tentative explanation of this relationship in terms of the agency theory, according to which managers of companies with higher profits want to disclose more information due to three reasons: first, by disclosing more items the managers can prove to shareholders and owners that they can be trusted to run the company well; second, by presenting their work in a good light they consolidate their position within the company; finally by revealing the data depicting their company as safe and stable, they hope to solicit potential investors. Feyitimi also observes that companies with low profit or no profit at all, want to disclose as little information as possible in order to cover up losses and declining profits (Feyitimi, 2014) . This leads to our third hypothesis: H3: The level of disclosure is positively associated with the profitability of a bank.
Hossain and Hammami (2009) note a positive association between the level of disclosure of a company and its complexity measured in the number of its subsidiaries. They maintain that companies with a more complex and diversified structure have implemented a more effective system of information management and gathering, which allows them to access the gathered data in an easier and more cost-efficient way. Thus, they reason, in general, companies with more subsidiaries disclose more information. Haniffa and Cook (2002) , on the other hand, do not report a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. This is why we wanted to test our fourth hypothesis: H4: The level of disclosure is positively associated with the complexity of a bank.
Eng and Mak (2003 in Juhmain, 2013) examined the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure. They noted that mostly government-owned companies carry higher agency costs, which they attributed to their conflicting objectives. On the one hand, they seek to maximize their profits, while on the other they want to act in the government's best interest. Disclosing more information helps decrease their agency cost. Government-owned companies also want to communicate more information to their shareholders and the general public. They are under much stricter control by their respective governments, and consequently, face greater demands as to transparency. As a result, they disclose more voluntary items in their annual reports that companies with lesser government ownership. Ghazi and Weetman (2006 in Juhmain, 2013) do not agree. In their opinion, government ownership alone does not amount to more disclosures in annual reports, quite the contrary. In government-owned companies, they found strong political ties, and argue that less disclosure should help to cover up such links. As a result of the above conflicting evidence we formulated our last hypothesis as: H5: The level of disclosure is positively associated with the share of government ownership.
Methods and data
The list of banks included in our study is based on the list of banks published on the website of Bank of Slovenia.
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Our dataset includes all banks operating in Slovenia in the year 2012 it was total of 17 banks and in the year 2015 it was 14 banks. The second year for observing the data was the year 2015, because in 2016 three banks merged into one, and 2 more banks were closed due to controlled liquidation. In year 2017, only 12 banks were left in business in Slovenia. Hence, the actual sample represents the population of operating banking companies in Slovenia, what is exactly the same case as in Hossain (2008) research. So, we followed the same methods as Hossain (2008) and Soliman (2013) .
The decision to observe annual reports for two years only has already been mentioned as a limitation of this research; for more, see the introductory section of this paper. We analysed the comprehensive set of annual reports for two years (2012 and 2015) , and this means that we had to count and analyze nearly a one and half million words. The data for this survey are drawn from disclosures and annual reports of Slovenian banks. The banks' annual reports in PDF format were accessed via the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services AJPES 3 information portal, and the gvin. , a referencing website offering relevant business data on Slovenian public and private companies. Not all banks' disclosures were published separately, i.e. in a separate document; if this was the case, we relied on the data published in their annual reports.
Disclosed items in annual reports of banks were analyzed by compiling a list of all possible disclosures, and then by checking an individual bank's disclosures against it. Researchers such as Wallace et al. (1994) , Cooke (1992 and 1993) , and Hossain (2000 Hossain ( , 2001 Hossain ( and 2008 , adopted a dichotomous procedure in which an item scores one if disclosed and zero if not disclosed. The suppliance of a particular disclosure was awarded 1 point and the non-suppliance 0 points, with the assumption that all disclosures were equally important. The total disclosure score (Σ discl) was calculated based on Hossain's formula (2008) When compiling the list of relevant disclosures, we considered only those items featured in the Decision on the books of account and annual reports of banks and savings banks (Bank of Slovenia, 2013a), and the Regulation on disclosures by banks and savings banks, (Bank of Slovenia, 2013b), which were used by banks in the preparation of their annual reports. Since then, both legal documents have been amended. In order to facilitate comparability, only those disclosures were considered which related to all banks. The obtained disclosures, totaling 144 items or points, were divided into 4 major sections, as shown in Table 1 . The content of individual sections is presented in more detail in Appendix 1.
For the independent variables we use the variables as we predicted the relation with the extent of disclosure, for each hypothesis we set one factor influencing the level of disclosure, this factors we named independent variables. Table 2 shows independent variables and the type of data acquired.
It is common that the observed variable assets and number of business unit are transformed from original value to log value due to meet normal distribution of these items (Baumann and Nier, 2004) . In our research we use the logarithmic form of variable assets and number of subsidiaries to reach the normal distribution of variables, as we can find in Soliman (2013), Baumann and Nier (2004) and Hossain (2008) .
The independent variable was set as we set the hypothesis of this research, thus based on previous theoretic background research. In regression analysis, we follow the Hossain (2008) model and statistic test development. The following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model is to be fitted to the data in order to assess the effect of each variable on the disclosure level: Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + e (2) Whereas: Y = total disclosure score received for each bank β0 =the intercept; β1 -β5 = independent variables e = the error term 5 Data analysis
Level of disclosures
The acquired data were analyzed using the SPSS 24 statistical software program. Based on statistical tests and calculations we were able to observe that, on average, banks in Slovenia publish 63.15% of a total of 144 items of disclosures in their annual reports. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for average disclosure scores of banks, derived from the analysis of 31 annual reports (n=31). The scores for BS items ranged from 17 to 28, with the average value 
Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis
In order to make valid inferences from the regression analysis, the residuals of the regression should follow a normal distribution (Statistics Solutions, 2018 (VIF) and is present when the simple correlation coefficient exceeds 0.8 or when the VIF surpasses 10, with an associated tolerance value below 0.1 (Hossain, 2008) .
The VIF values are presented in the last column of Table 6 . With the maximum value of 1.702 calculated for variable government ownership, none of the values exceed 10, which would have been considered an indication of multicollinearity. Tolerance levels ranged between 0.588 and 0.854 and did not fall below 0.1, suggesting that there were no problems with multicollinearity.
Based on correlation and VIF values it can thus be safely assumed that correlations between independent variables were not so strong as to constitute a problem in the interpretation of data obtained by multiple regression. Table 4 shows correlation coefficients for surveyed independent variables. The strongest relationship, calculated at -0.480, existed between independent variables age and government ownership and this correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). As none of the coefficients does not exceed an absolute value of 0.8, no strong multicollinearity was established that would have negatively impacted the results of multiple regression analysis.
Multiple regression and hypotheses
Multiple correlation coefficient (r) indicates the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Our calculated value r=0.833 suggests a strong correlation. The multiple coefficient of determination (R 2 ) was established at R 2= 0.694, which means that nearly 70% of the total variance in the dependent variable (disclosure items in annual reports of banks) can be explained by the variability in the independent variables (age, size, profitability and complexity of a bank, and the government share). The value of the corrected coefficient of determination was 0.632. Table 5 shows data on the reliability of the regression function. It provides information as to whether the correlation between the dependent and independent variables indeed exists, and whether changes in the independent variables cause changes in the dependent variables, or are these changes merely coincidental. A low p-value (p<0.05) means that the variable significantly contributes to the prediction and, therefore, the correlation may be confirmed.
The p-value we calculated was very low (p= 0.000), in- dicating that the connection between the dependent and independent variables was strong, and confirming the statistical significance of the regression function. Table 6 presents data on statistical significance of selected independent variables. P-values of less than 0.05 (p<0.05) suggest that a particular variable has a statistically significant impact on disclosures in annual reports of banks. If p>0.05, the effect is statistically insignificant. Statistically significant coefficients were calculated for variables age (p = 0.001), size (p=0.021) and government ownership (p=0.012). No statistical significance could be established for complexity which represents the variable log of number of subsidiaries in Slovenia (p>0.166) and profitability measured with Return on assets (p=0.245).
Our regression model is:
Level of disclosures = β0 + β1 age of years old + β2 Log of Asset value + β3 Gvt.ownership + β4 ROA +β5 Log of subsidiaries in Slovenia +e
In order to make valid inferences from your regression, the residuals of the regression should follow a normal distribution. We have examined a normal Predicted Probability (P-P) with plotting (See Figure 1 ) residuals of the regression model. In figure 1 we can see that the residuals are normally distributed and we can assume normality of the residuals of our regression. We conform to the diagonal normality line indicated in the plot, and we can say that our findings are valid. The next step is to reveal our findings and make conclusions, this follows in section 6.
Findings and conclusions
The correlation between the dependent and independents variable we were able to determine was between the level of disclosure in annual reports of a bank and its age. However, the degree of correlation was the strongest for banks that fall within the "middle age" category (mean age of 76 years), and not for banks that exist on the longest. The established correlations between levels of disclosure and age for young and old banks were significantly lower; hypothesis 1 is thus not supported by our findings, and we have to reject it. Authors who have studied this association in the past have come to differing conclusions. Hossain (2008) and Soliman (2013) , for example, did not find a statistically significant effect of a bank's age on the level of disclosure, whereas Hossain and Hammami (2009) report a positive and significant variable of age, which suggests that a more advanced age of a company directly influences the level of disclosure.
The obtained values for the variable of size, which is Organizacija, Volume 51 Issue 4, November 2018 Research Papers measured in the value of a bank's assets (variable is expressed logarithmic form), were significant, and suggest a positive correlation between company size and the level of disclosure. This suggests that larger banks disclose more information in their annual reports that smaller banks, which supports our Hypothesis 2. Our results are also consistent with findings of other studies, e.g. Hossain (2008) , Hossain and Hammami (2009), Soliman (2013) , Juhmain (2013) and Hancock, et al. (2009) . The results of multiple regression do not indicate a correlation between the level of disclosure and a bank's profitability, therefore our Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Hossain and Hammami (2009) and Juhmani (2013) also found no association between profitability and the level of disclosure, while Hossain (2008) and Soliman (2013) report a positive correlation between both variables.
No statistically significant relationship could be found between the complexity of a bank and the level of disclosure in its annual reports; therefore, we reject Hypothesis 4. Hossain (2008) also concludes that the number of subsidiaries as the measure of the complexity does not affect the level of disclosure. Contrastingly, Hossain and Hammami (2009) report a positive correlation between the two variables.
The multiple regression results finally revealed a positive relationship between the share of government ownership and the level of disclosure. Our findings, therefore, lend support to our Hypothesis 5, that banks with a higher share owned by the Republic of Slovenia disclose more items. The research results from other countries, however, show a different picture. Juhmani (2013) and Jalil and Devi (2012) , for example, report that state-owned companies reveal less than those in private ownership. This paper reports on the level of disclosure in annual reports of banks in Slovenia over the period 2012 -2015. The first findings are that banks in Slovenia have below average all of disclosures with banks achieving between 73 (min.) and 113 (max.), their mean at 90.94 points or 63% of all possible points for disclosures in their annual reports, against previous comparable research of disclosures, e. g. La Porta et al. (1998) where companies make up 70%, and Brown and Martinsson (2014) got a result of disclosure intensity by mean 71.95% of 20 annual reports in 20 countries from across the World.. Banks in Slovenia do not cover 70% of the total list of disclosures (see appendix A), so, we can say that banks in Slovenia have not above average care about their transparency. And on the other hand, banks in Slovenia on average, publish 63% of the total disclosure, and this is above the score of analyzed Indian banks (Hossain, 2008) which scored 60%. The population was not the same, but it can be said that Slovenian banks disclosure less information than is average in other companies in other countries, and more than banks in India.
Why the banks in Slovenia disclosure less than banks in other countries? Maybe in Slovenia banks think they have a strong position, and they act arrogate because of weak institutional controls and low competition on banks and capital markets in Slovenia. Since banks in Slovenia unveil a sub-average amount of information in their annual reports compared to other surveys, we propose more public awareness by the Bank of Slovenia and audit companies that audit the annual reporting of banks and more control activities from Bank of Slovenia on this focus.
Our results largely coincide with the findings of other studies, e.g. Hossain (2008 ) or Soliman (2013 . In our opinion, the observed differences can be explained, at least in part, by the specificities of the Slovenian banking system, due to its past development and organization.
Our first interesting finding is a establish a correlation between independent variable government ownership and age, a calculated correlation coefficient at -0.480 shows a negative relationship, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and it can understand that the older that the bank is, the less ownership belongs to the state of Slovenia. This is some kind of truth because Slovenia has to move out of state banks due to Slovenia had recapitalized its ailing state-owned banks with 3.2 billion Euros in 2013 (Bank of Slovenia, 2014) . Slovenia has had one of the recapitalized banks already sold (NKBM bank, d.d.) and the second one (NLB bank, d.d.) is in process of selling them. Results of regression analysis provide us a basis, that we have rejected the first hypothesis, that the level of disclosure is positively associated with the age of the bank. Our model equips us with findings, that the age of a bank does have a significant negative statistical impact (p=0.001) with -0.100 points of total disclosures for each year of age on the scope of disclosures in annual reports of banks in Slovenia. Based on this evidence, we can say that the bank older than 76 years (mean is 76 years old), the bank disclosure a little less information for every additional year of age.
Our findings suggest that the most important underlying factor that affected the level in disclosure in Slovenian banks was the share of government ownership and size, which is measured in the value of a bank's assets. Thus, the largest number of items was disclosed by banks which were partially or wholly owned by the Republic of Slovenia and these banks are the largest in Slovenia. We found out that the smaller Slovenian banks revealed more than larger banks, but we can say that any increase in assets of bank also means more disclosures in their annual report.
One of our most interesting findings is that the results of multiple regression don't indicate a correlation between the level of disclosure and a bank's profitability, this is completely opposite of most observed researches which report a positive association between profitability and the level of disclosure in annual reports of banks, e. g. Baumann and Nier (2004) , Hossain and Hammami, 2009, Hossain (2008) . We have calculated negative impact (which is insignificant p=0.245) with -1.22 point of total disclosures for each rising percentage of return on assets on scope of disclosures in annual reports of banks in Slovenia. This means (not statistically significant) the higher profits want to disclose less information, maybe due to reasons: first, by disclosing fewer items the bank can hide what's really happening in bank to shareholders; second, by avoidance of disclosures they do not want to encourage suspicions about the poor performance of the bank and neither remain a good reputation of bank.
We believe that the obtained results largely reflect the legal framework of the Slovenian banking system, which is more rigorous for Slovenian banks and more lenient to foreign banks, which are consequently able to disclose certain information only at the level of their parent company. The annual reports of a majority of Slovenian banks are supplemented by disclosures under the Decision regulating disclosures by banks and savings banks as a separate document. Banks disclose this information in their annual reports, but frequently in less depth and detail. The practical implications suggested by results of our research are, that the regulation and control institution in Slovenia (in this case this is The bank of Slovenia) should increase a control over the older and state-owned banks in Slovenia and their disclosures in annual reports.
A higher level of disclosure is also required from larger banks, which is understandable since their business operations are, as a rule, more complex and cover more areas. Smaller banks, however, do not disclose certain information because it is irrelevant or immaterial to their business. Additionally, smaller banks have to consider if the value of disclosing the information may not be higher than the cost of its gathering.
The limitation of the research is that it covers a two year and a single specific country, and in order to understand the nature of variations of overall disclosure in the annual report of Slovenian banks, it is necessary to undertake a study taking more data in the future, perhaps in next five and 10 years data. It will be more realistic when the consolidation of the banking system in Slovenia will be done, for this will maybe take some more than 10 years. We think that annual reports with so many disclosures as possible can contribute significantly to a bank's success and public trust in their business.
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